I. Introduction
In 2001, a twenty-day sit-in at Harvard University brought the living-wage debate to the forefront of American consciousness. After a six-month study, the Harvard Committee on Employment and Contracting Policies, a 19 member committee of faculty, staff, administrators and students that had been appointed by Harvard's president as a result of the discussions to end the sit-in, recommended giving raises to the university's lowest paid employees and relying more on collective bargaining in the future to assure that the wages paid by subcontractors did not undercut local union wage scales.
1 A threeday sit-in at the University of Connecticut that related to the living wage issue also yielded a substantive victory for campus workers. The protesters there generated an almost two-dollar increase in wages, as well as substantial improvement in benefits for many of the university's workers. 2 Collectively these struggles represent a new battleground in American higher education.
The growth of living wage movements on almost one hundred campuses reflects the large variation in the wages paid to college and university staff across the country.
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There are many potential explanations for these salary differences, including differences in local cost of living and differences in the resources that the academic institutions have available to pay faculty and staff salaries. One other possible explanation is the influence of staff unions. Previous studies of the impact of unions on salaries in academia have focused on faculty unions and have concluded that faculty unions have increased the 1 Chronicle of Higher Education (January 11, 2002) 2 Chronicle of Higher Education (May 25, 2001) 3 Martin Van Der Werf (August 3, 2001) salaries of their members relative to the salaries of faculty at academic institutions in which faculty are not covered by collective bargaining agreements by at best a small percentage amount. 4 There have been no studies, however, of the impact of collective bargaining on staff salaries in higher education.
Our paper addresses this issue. After providing some background data on the number of blue-collar and white-collar employees covered by collective bargaining agreements at American higher education institutions, we use data from a 1997-1998 study on the costs of staffing in higher education conducted by the Association of Higher Education Facilities Officers (APPA) and other sources to estimate models that explain the variation in academic institutions' salaries for a number of narrowly defined blue collar and white collar occupational groups that are employed by the academic institutions' facilities divisions. 5 Of primary interest to us, is the extent to which the salaries of academic staff covered by collective bargaining agreements exceed the salaries of otherwise comparable academic staff that are not covered by such agreements. We restrict our attention to the 9 occupations for which at least 115 institutions in the sample reported both an occupational salary level and whether the employees in the occupation were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Table 3 shows the difference in the mean annual salaries of unionized and non-unionized employees for each occupation, as well as the ratio of the mean salary in an occupation for employees that were covered by union contracts to the mean salary in an occupation for employees 6 We are grateful to Joseph Lally, Director of Business Operations for Cornell's Facilities Services Division, for granting us access to these data, under the condition that we not identify the specific institutions that participated in the survey. percent. The differentials were largest in the skilled trades. Salaries for custodial workers, the group of employees that have been the focus of the living wage debate on many campuses were the lowest in the group and the unionized custodial workers in the sample earned about 35 percent more on average than custodial workers at academic institutions that were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
II. Background Data

III. Estimating the Union/Nonunion Salary Advantage of Unionized Academic Staff
The estimated differences in the salaries of academic staff covered by and not covered by union contracts reported in table 3 are raw differences that do not control for characteristics of the institutions, or the areas in which the institutions are located, that might be expected to influence staff salaries independent of unionization. For example, if academic institutions whose employees were organized also had greater financial resources, or were located in higher cost of living areas, than institutions whose employees were not organized, one would expect to observe the former paying higher salaries than the latter, even if unionization per se had no effect on the salaries of staff at academic institutions. To estimate, whether staff unions to influence salaries, it is necessary to control for the other characteristics of the institutions that might be expected to influence salaries. We include in the Y i a set of variables that influence the resources that the academic institutions have at their command out of which to pay the salaries of staff.
These include the logarithm of the institution's endowment per student (LENDOW), the logarithm of its average undergraduate tuition (LTUIT) and, for public institutions, the logarithm of its state and local government appropriation per student (LAPP). 9 In our basic specification, we also include the logarithm of the average salary that the institution pays its full professors (LSAL), under the assumption that this probably represents the best single measure of the financial capacity of the institution. Also included in this vector, to control for differences in cost of living or wage levels across areas, is the 8 More precisely, the estimated union/nonunion salary differential is given by ( e -1) (100) 1 a logarithm of the mean salary of custodians in the city in which the academic institution is located (LMEAN). When an institution was not located in a city for which we had mean custodian salary data, the mean custodian wage in the state was substituted. Finally, included in this vector is the logarithm of the average math and verbal SAT 75 th percentile score for entering freshmen at the institution (LSAT). This variable, as well as the Carnegie category variables were included to see if the "selectivity" of an academic institution, or its institutional type, influences the salary of its staff, once we have controlled for its financial resources. Table 4 presents the estimates of our logarithm of occupational salary equations.
Looking first at the effect of being covered by a collective bargaining contract on the salary of staff, for 6 of the 9 occupations union coverage is associated, other factors held constant, with higher salaries, with the estimated differentials being in the range of 10 to 17 percent. The differentials are the largest for several of the occupations that historically have been heavily unionized nationwide in the building trades. Relevant to the living wage debate, we do observe that unionized custodians appear to earn about 10 percent more than nonunionized custodians at academic institutions, other factors held constant Turning next to the financial variables, staff members' salaries are clearly strongly related to the proxy for the cost of living or alternative wages in the area. For most occupations, one cannot reject the hypothesis that a 1 percent increase in the average wage of custodians in the area is associated with a 1 percent increase in the academic staff members' salaries.
Salaries of staff members at American colleges and universities are also clearly related to the salaries paid to full professors employed at their institutions. Interestingly, the magnitude of the relationship appears to be strongest for the one white-collar occupation represented in our sample, administrative secretary. Once we control for the salaries paid to full professors, we find little evidence that knowledge of the financial picture facing the institution, as measured by its endowment per student, its average tuition level or, for publics, its per student state and local government appropriation level, influence its staff members' salaries 10
Other factors held constant, including the financial and unionization variables, for several categories of staff, the Carnegie category of the institution in which they are employed is a statistically significant determinant of their salaries. In particular, administrative secretaries, custodial employees, and locksmiths employed at 2-year institutions appear to earn 12 to 25 percent more than their counterparts who are employed at baccalaureate, masters, doctoral or research institutions. Put perhaps another way, 2-year institutions appear to be the least elitist; the faculty/staff salary differential is lowest at these institutions. 11 Finally, the selectivity of an institution's undergraduate students, as measured by their SAT scores, is not related to the salaries of staff in these occupations.
IV. Testing for the Sensitivity of Our Findings to Alternative Specifications
Our primary concern is the effect of unionization of staff employees at academic institutions on the salaries of those staff employees. Table 5 summarizes the results of 10 As we indicate in the next section, we also estimated models that excluded the logarithm of full professors' average salary. However, in these models the measures we included of the institutions' financial wealth-endowment per student, tuition and state and local appropriations per student -again never proved to be positively related to the salaries of staff in an occupation 11 For the other occupations, two-year colleges also appear to pay higher salaries, ceteris paribus, than the other categories of institutions but the estimated differentials are usually not statistically significantly different from zero.
additional econometric modeling we conducted to investigate the sensitivity of the estimated union coefficient to the variables included in the analyses and to the econometric methods we utilized. Row A of We attempted to reestimate the models underlying table 4, adding as an additional explanatory variable the fraction of all 9 occupations that were covered by collective bargaining agreements. 12 Unfortunately, when 1 of the 9 occupations was covered by a contract, the vast majority of the other occupations also were covered by a contract.
Hence the coverage by union contract variable for an occupation was very highly correlated with the fraction of the 9 occupations at the institution that were covered by union contracts. The high degree of collinearity prevented us from estimating such a model.
A second way to get at this issue is simply to treat the 9 occupational salary equations as a single system and to allow the error terms to be correlated across equations. Estimating this system using the method of seemingly unrelated regressions will increase the efficiency of our estimates, however, as long as none of the other statistical assumption was violated, the estimates reported in table 4 would remain unbiased.
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The method of seemingly unrelated regressions will increase the efficiency of the estimated coefficients only if the identical explanatory variables do not appear in each equation. In our system, the only explanatory variable that varies across occupations is whether employees in an occupation are covered by a collective bargaining agreement at an institution. We have already indicated that the fraction of occupations organized at an institution is highly correlated with whether any one of the occupations is organized across institutions. Given this fact, it is not surprising that the estimated union coefficients that we obtained when we reestimated the model by seemingly unrelated regressions (these estimates found in row C of table 5); the estimated prove to be very similar to the coefficients found in row A of the table. Any differences are probably due 12 Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) followed a similar procedure in their study of the impact of public sector unions on the wages of different occupational categories of public employees. 13 The seemingly unrelated regression model was developed by Arnold Zellner (1962) to sampling error since the seemingly unrelated regression model could only be estimated using data on the subset of institutions that reported occupational salary and unionization data for all 9 occupations.
Finally, our estimates of the salary advantage that staff who work in unionized academic environments have over staff who work in nonunion academic environments treats staff coverage by a collective bargaining agreement as being exogenous. If, for example, the institutions in which we observe staff covered by a collective bargaining agreement were initially the institutions in which staff compensation was lowest, other factors held constant, our estimates will understate the extent to which academic staff unions have improved their members compensation relative to the compensation of academic staff at institutions not covered by collective bargaining agreements.
In the absence of having a panel data set that would permit us to estimate how changes in staff salaries at academic institutions are related to changes in collective bargaining coverage, there are two ways to handle this problem. The first is to obtain an instrument for the presence of a union contract and to reestimate our basic model using the method of instrumental variables. We obtained an instrument for collective bargaining for a staff occupation at an institution by regressing this variable on all of the other variables found on the right hand side of the salary equations, as well the proportions of private and public employees in the institution's state covered by collected bargaining agreements, each interacted with a dichotomous variable indicating whether the institution was a public or private institution. 14 14 The latter four variables are included to allow both public and private collective bargaining coverage in the state to influence whether the occupation at an academic institution was covered by a collective bargaining agreement, but to allow the importance of each of these variables to depend upon whether the institution was a public or a private institution.
The estimated union coverage coefficients that we obtained using this methodology are found in row D of table 5. All of the estimated union coefficients are now statistically significantly different from zero and their magnitudes have increased.
Indeed, on balance they are now very close to the raw differences in the salaries of unionized and nonunionized staff in these occupations that are found in table 3. The implication of this result is that those academic institutions in which staff in these occupations have been organized were, on balance, among the lower paying academic institutions, other factors held constant, at the time that they were first organized
The second is to use the sample selection bias correction method developed by James Heckman (1979) and Lung-fei Lee (1978) . To implement this method, we estimate a probit equation for union coverage in an occupation in which union coverage is assumed to be a function of the variables discussed above. 15 The estimates of this equation allow us to compute an estimate of the inverse mills ratio for each observation, this is added as an additional explanatory variable to equation and equation (1) The estimated union coefficients that we obtained when the sample selection bias correction method was used are found in row E of table 5. In most cases these estimates prove to be very similar to the OLS estimates reported in row A. The estimated union coefficients for carpenters, electricians, heating and cooling technicians, painters and plumbers remain statistically significant and each coefficient is close to its value in the OLS equations. The estimated union coefficients for secretaries, groundskeepers and locksmiths are statistically insignificantly different from zero, as they were in the OLS estimation. While custodians' salaries appeared to be higher when they were covered by a collective bargaining contract in the OLS specification, the selectivity corrected estimate of the effects of unions on custodians' salaries is close to zero.
V. Concluding Remarks
Our paper has provided an initial effort at estimating the effect of collective bargaining coverage on the salaries of staff members at American higher education institutions. When we treated collective bargaining coverage as exogenous, we obtain estimated union/nonunion salary differentials that are in the range of 10 to 17 percent for the occupations in our sample. When we remove full professor salaries from the set of control variables used in the model, these differentials increase by about 3 percentage points. When we treat collective bargaining coverage as endogenous and estimate the union/nonunion differential using an instrumental variable approach, the differentials rise to the 15 to 40 percent range, which is roughly what the unadjusted mean differences were in the sample in the salaries of staff covered and not covered by collective bargaining agreements. However, these latter estimates are a good deal higher than previous estimates of the impact of unions on their members' relative salaries, either for the economy as a whole or for the public sector and when we instead use a sample selection bias model to correct for the endogenity of union coverage, estimates close to the OLS estimates are obtained for most occupations.
The limitations of our study should be kept in mind. The sample of 163 academic institutions used in our study is not necessarily representative of the population of over whose salaries we analyze all relate to employees employed in the facilities division of America's colleges and universities and the effects that we estimate for them are not necessarily representative of the effects for staff unions that one might observe for a wider range of college and university staff employed in other areas (for example, housing and dining, athletics, academic support, student services, external relations).
Nonetheless our study does suggest that collective bargaining coverage does influence staff salaries in higher education. The National Labor Relations Act governs collective bargaining for staff of private academic institutions, while state public employee bargaining laws govern collective bargaining for staff at public academic institutions. While student and faculty activists on campuses around the country may continue to press academic institutions to pay living wages to their lower paid staff, including custodial staff, our findings suggest that a more direct way to achieve better salaries for low-paid college and university employees is to encourage them to organize and bargain collectively. Unlike private college and university faculty members, who are effectively precluded from collective bargaining at many institutions because of the Supreme Courts decision in the Yeshiva case, there is no such prohibition to prevent staff at these institutions from organizing.
16
Our study also suggested that other factors held constant, including the proxy for area cost-of-living and area wage levels and collective bargaining coverage, that there is no evidence that more financially well-off academic institutions pay their staff higher salaries. Whether public pressure can be effectively brought to bear on a wider range of academic institutions that have the financial resources to improve their staff salaries if
16 See NLRB V. Yeshiva University, 944 U.S. 672 (1980) Source: Authors' computations from the APPA data. Only institutions that reported union coverage for an occupation and a salary figure for an occupation are included interaction between a 0,1 dichotomous variable for being a public institutions and the logarithm of appropriations per student from state and local governments. LEND logarithm of endowment per student at the institution. Where:
(A) OLS coefficients from table 4 (B) OLS coefficients from model that excludes the logarithm of average faculty salary (C) Seemingly unrelated regression estimates for the model estimated in table for the sample of institutions that report data for all 9 occupations (D) Instrumental variable estimates of the model estimated in table 4 in which an instrument for the collective bargaining coverage variable is obtained from regressing coverage on the proportions of public and private employees in the state covered by collective bargaining agreements-each interacted with whether the institution is public or private-and all of the other right hand side variables from the wage equations (E) Selectivity bias corrected estimates of the model estimated in table 4 
